LX-LGX wrote: This is no topic for a joke, but Boeing has made a painfull error in their mail: "... crews should be reminded to carefully monitor primary flight instruments (airspeed, attitude etc.)..."
So where's the part where we should start laughing
LX-LGX wrote: This is no topic for a joke, but Boeing has made a painfull error in their mail: "... crews should be reminded to carefully monitor primary flight instruments (airspeed, attitude etc.)..."
So where's the part where we should start laughing
Some facts:
Turkish 'Tansport' Minister Tariq Aziz II (Binali Yildirim) said: there were no casualties.
Turks blame the western 'European' countries for complot theories to protect their home Airlines.
Turkish Airline Pilots Association (TALPA) blame 'wake' turbulence and LVNL for plane crash.
Turkish media can publish 'and/or speak' freely without censorship.
Turkish 'Airline' pilots are World's best and can't or don't fail.
LX-LGX wrote:
Crews should monitor their attitude, says Boeing.
Mrs. Boeing means BASIC INSTRUMENT SCANNING SKILLS.
In this case Attitude indicator or Artificial Horizon and NOT 'any' BAD or GOOD 'personal' attitude
LX-LGX wrote:
This is no topic for a joke, but Boeing has made a painfull error in their mail: "... crews should be reminded to carefully monitor primary flight instruments (airspeed, attitude etc.)..."
In a way the mail is correct. Pilots with the right attitude do watch altitude meters
flightlover wrote:
In a way the mail is correct. Pilots with the right attitude do watch altitude meters
It's totally ridiculous .... Mrs. Boeing have to remind 'Professional' (especially modern NG Aircraft) Crews for carefully maintaining or monitoring basic 'primary flight instruments' scanning skills.
earthman wrote:"If you see birds flying straight up or down, pitch the aircraft by 90 degrees."
And prepare for the bird strike ...
But seriously: can I, as an experienced pax but without any experience in the flight deck, really conclude from the findings so far that it looks like the crew just waited too long before they took action? So maybe the trainer pilot let the trainee do "wrong things" for too long under the given circumstances before he tried to step in?
Basic Flying Rules:
1. Try to stay in the middle of the air.
2. Do not go near the edges of it.
3. The edges of the air can be recognized by the appearance of ground, buildings, sea, trees and interstellar space. It is much more difficult to fly there.
Speed is life, altitude is life insurance.
Airspeed, altitude or brains.
Two are always needed to successfully complete the flight.
A 'GOOD' landing is one from which you can walk away.
A 'GREAT' landing is one after which you can use the aircraft again.
Three most common CVR expressions (famous last words) are: - Why is it doing that? - Where are we? - Oh Shit!
I remember when sex was safe and flying was dangerous.
Qantas and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau said they will consult with and assist Dutch crash investigators after a QF 737-800 last week suffered a radio altimeter malfunction similar to the one that is suspected of causing the loss of a Turkish Airlines -800 on approach to Amsterdam on Feb. 25.
Qantas Flight 1020, an -800 operating from Hobart to Sydney on April 7, experienced the radio altimeter fault on approach. According to a QF spokesperson, the -800 was "at approximately 100 ft. when the captain's radio altimeter indicated that the aircraft was at around 10 ft., about where the auto thrust activates full retard on the throttles."
As in the THY crash, the captain's altimeter was indicating a different set of data than the first officer's. "Upon noticing the fault, the captain immediately disconnected from the auto thrust and manually flew the aircraft into Sydney," the spokesperson said. "It is Qantas flight operations policy for pilots to guard the thrust levers and fly with hands on the levers when the aircraft is on auto, which ensures that should a fault with the thrust levers occur, the pilots are immediately able to fly manually."
The carrier self-reported the incident to ATSB, which confirmed it will investigate due to the similarity of the fault to the assumed cause of the THY crash. The QF spokesman told ATWOnline that "there is no suggestion by the ATSB that Qantas or its pilots were at fault. This investigation is simply to assist European regulatory authorities."
A preliminary investigation by the Dutch Safety Board revealed that the only fault discovered on the aircraft was in the captain's radio altimeter, which suddenly changed from 1,950 ft. to read -8 ft. in altitude although the right-hand altimeter functioned correctly.
source: ATWOnline
euroflyer wrote:But seriously: can I, as an experienced pax but without any experience in the flight deck, really conclude from the findings so far that it looks like the crew just waited too long before they took action? So maybe the trainer pilot let the trainee do "wrong things" for too long under the given circumstances before he tried to step in?
No offense intended, but don't conclude anything before you've finished reading the report.
While approaching a bit too fast and too high, the Captain's faulty radio-altimeter screwed up the way auto-throttles were supposed to work. There were two little indications of that bug, but they didn't get any of them. And it is very unfortunate that the biggest opportunity they had to catch the malfunction was at a time they were very busy (breaking out of the cloud, looking outside for the runway, finishing the checklist, advising F/A to sit down). So they were late to notice something was wrong. And when they noticed it they left the stupid machine with bogus information fall from the sky within seconds (i.e. tried to go-around but left the auto-throttles "ON", so the engines went back to idle again).
This article is from ATW Online. It is a fresh news:
Qantas 737 suffers altimeter fault similar to doomed THY aircraft
Monday April 13, 2009 Qantas and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau said they will consult with and assist Dutch crash investigators after a QF 737-800 last week suffered a radio altimeter malfunction similar to the one that is suspected of causing the loss of a Turkish Airlines -800 on approach to Amsterdam on Feb. 25.
Qantas Flight 1020, an -800 operating from Hobart to Sydney on April 7, experienced the radio altimeter fault on approach. According to a QF spokesperson, the -800 was "at approximately 100 ft. when the captain's radio altimeter indicated that the aircraft was at around 10 ft., about where the auto thrust activates full retard on the throttles."
As in the THY crash, the captain's altimeter was indicating a different set of data than the first officer's (ATWOnline, March 5). "Upon noticing the fault, the captain immediately disconnected from the auto thrust and manually flew the aircraft into Sydney," the spokesperson said. "It is Qantas flight operations policy for pilots to guard the thrust levers and fly with hands on the levers when the aircraft is on auto, which ensures that should a fault with the thrust levers occur, the pilots are immediately able to fly manually."
The carrier self-reported the incident to ATSB, which confirmed it will investigate due to the similarity of the fault to the assumed cause of the THY crash. The QF spokesman told ATWOnline that "there is no suggestion by the ATSB that Qantas or its pilots were at fault. This investigation is simply to assist European regulatory authorities."
A preliminary investigation by the Dutch Safety Board revealed that the only fault discovered on the aircraft was in the captain's radio altimeter, which suddenly changed from 1,950 ft. to read -8 ft. in altitude although the right-hand altimeter functioned correctly.
by Geoffrey Thomas
I would like to thank Mr.Thomas and ATW Online. I hope they don't mind I have copied this.
hakan wrote:This article is from ATW Online. It is a fresh news:
Qantas 737 suffers altimeter fault similar to doomed THY aircraft
...
...
I would like to thank Mr.Thomas and ATW Online. I hope they don't mind I have copied this.
Hakan,
The faulty altimeter was not the cause: the faulty altimeter was a technical problem.
The cause of the crash was the unsuitable reaction from the crew to that technical problem. All people involved in Turkish aviation should accept this.
The article is written by Mr.Thomas. I haven't added anything to it or even ever said/written anything under this "header" until now. I have refrained making comments until an official investigation done and results were revealed.
What I was trying to point out with publishing this article that the problem is still out there and needs urgent attention by Boeing. Until that is fixed I guess the pilots should rely more on their judgements than letting computers and instruments to have the full control of the a/c during landings.
The accident in Amsterdam was a wake up call to all aviation people including your Turkish colleagues. The blame of this accident lays mostly on the crew but also on the other contributing factors. Unfortunately lessons sometimes can be learned hard ways with costs of lives.
My heart goes to those families who lost their loved ones including the THY family.
No worries, Boeing is very aware of it (even embarrassed too) and is working on it since the fourth day after the accident. But don't ask me if they put more engineers on it than they put lawyers on the upcoming class action suit, 'cause I really don't know. And I don't think I'd want to know the answer either...
hakan wrote:Until that is fixed I guess the pilots should rely more on their judgements than letting computers and instruments to have the full control of the a/c during landings.
I was taught this should always and everywhere be observed, indeed: machines are very nice auxiliaries, pilots should remain master at any time. That's what they were trained for, after all, and also that is what they are paid for.
But of course I am only an humble student ultralight pilot...
And indeed: first and most of all, our sympathy and prayers ought to be with the deceased and their relatives.
Frankly I am amazed that the radalt can go from 1950 to -8 without triggering an error in the system. Even more interesting, how on earth can a radalt give a negative height? That in itself should switch the plane's systems into error mode.
BOEING AIRPLANE .......
FLIGHT OPERATIONS TECHNICAL BULLETIN
NUMBER: 737-09-2 R1
DATE: March 30, 2009
These bulletins provide information which may prove useful in airline operations or airline training. This information will remain in effect depending on production changes, customer-originated modifications, and Service Bulletin incorporation. Information in these bulletins is supplied by the Boeing Company and may not be approved or endorsed by the FAA at the time of writing. Applicable documentation will be revised as necessary to reflect the information contained in these bulletins. For further information, contact Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, Chief Pilot, Flight Technical, P.O. Box 3707, Mail Stop 14-HA, Seattle, WA, USA 98124-2207, Phone (206) 5449610, Fax (206) 544-9687, SITA: SEABO7X Station 627.
SUBJECT: Flight Crew Monitoring During Automatic Flight
APPLIES TO: 737 All
Background Information
An erroneous Low Range Radio Altimeter (LRRA) has been identified in connection with a recent 737-800 accident.
The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) data indicates that the crew was using both the autopilot and the autothrottle during an ILS approach. The right LRRA was providing accurate data to the first officer’s display and the left LRRA was erroneously providing a reading of -8 feet to the captain’s display. No amber RA flag was displayed because the left LRRA system did not declare the data invalid.
On all 737s, the autothrottle logic uses left radio altimeter data if the left radio altitude is being displayed. This is regardless of the autopilot selected. On the 737NG, if the left amber RA flag is displayed in place of radio altitude, the autothrottle will use right radio altimeter data instead. On the 737-200 and 737-300/400/500, the autothrottle computer is only connected to the left radio altimeter; therefore, if the left RA failure flag is displayed, there will be no radio altimeter inputs to the autothrottle.
In this event, when the airplane descended through approximately 1950 feet on the approach with flaps extended beyond 12 ½ degrees, the autothrottle erroneously sensed that the airplane was in landing flare. The thrust levers were retarded to the idle stop where they remained for approximately 100 seconds. For the first 70 of the 100 seconds, idle thrust was sufficient to maintain the selected airspeed. During the next 30 seconds, airspeed decreased below the selected MCP speed to approximately 40 knots below the selected approach speed.
The two LRRA systems provide height above ground data to aircraft systems which include the displays, autothrottle, autopilots and configuration/ground proximity warning. If one LRRA provides erroneous altitude readings, the associated flight deck effects may typically include:
• Large differences between displayed radio altitude.
• Inability to engage both autopilots in dual channel approach (APP) mode.
• Unexpected removal of the Flight Director Command Bars during approach on the pilot’s side with the erroneous radio altimeter display.
• Unexpected Configuration Warnings after takeoff, during approach, or during go-around.
• Inappropriate Flight Mode Annunciation (FMA) indication of autothrottle RETARD mode during approach phase with the airplane above 27 feet AGL.
There will also be corresponding thrust lever movement towards the idle stop.
The FMA will continue to indicate RETARD after the thrust levers have reached the idle stop rather than change to ARM.
Boeing Recommendations
Whether in automated or manual flight, flight crews must carefully monitor primary flight instruments (airspeed, attitude etc.) for aircraft performance and the FMA for autoflight modes.
The following information is taken from the Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM) and has been adapted to provide Flight Crews and Operators with guidelines which should be followed if a flight crew encounters any of the above mentioned indications.
General Guidelines
Condition:
• Large differences between displayed data.
Crew Resource Management (CRM) involves the effective use of all available resources to operate a flight safely. It is important that all flight deck crewmembers identify and communicate any situation that appears potentially unsafe or out of the ordinary.
Experience has proven that the most effective way to maintain safety of flight and resolve these situations is to combine the skills and experience of all crewmembers in the decision making process to determine the safest course of action.
Situational awareness, or the ability to accurately perceive what is going on in the flight deck, requires ongoing questioning, crosschecking, communication, and refinement of perception.
• Inability to engage both autopilots in dual channel approach (APP) mode.
• Unexpected removal of the Flight Director Command Bars during approach on the pilot’s side with the erroneous radio altimeter display.
• Inappropriate Flight Mode Annunciation (FMA) indication of autothrottle RETARD mode during approach phase with the airplane above 27 feet AGL.
There will also be corresponding thrust lever movement towards the idle stop.
The FMA will continue to indicate RETARD after the thrust levers have reached the idle stop rather than change to ARM.
Automatic systems give excellent results in the vast majority of situations. Faults can occur at any point during an automatic approach. Many non-normal situations or scenarios are possible. The flight deck is designed so that a quick analysis and decision can be made for virtually all non-normal or fault situations using the autopilot/autothrottle indicators, FMAs, master caution system and, for fail operational airplanes, autoland status annunciations. Deviations in intended flight path or unexpected thrust lever movement may also be an indication of an automation fault.
If the flight crew is aware of a degraded Autopilot Flight Director Systems (AFDS) mode, special recognition should be given during the Approach Briefing as to how to manage the use of the automatic features.
Note:
Early intervention prevents unsatisfactory airplane performance or a degraded flight path.
When the automatic systems as described above do not perform as expected, the PF should reduce the level of automation to ensure proper control of the airplane is maintained.
The PF should not attempt to restore higher levels of automation until after aircraft control is assured.
• Unexpected Configuration Warnings after takeoff, during approach, or during go-around.
Flight crew must ensure the proper configuration for the phase of flight. Time may be required in order to assess the situation, take corrective action and resolve the discrepancy; therefore a go-around, holding, or additional maneuvering may be necessary. Flight path control and monitoring of instruments must never be
compromised.
Non-Normal Situation Guidelines
When a non-normal situation occurs, the following guidelines apply.
• NON-NORMAL RECOGNITION:
The crewmember recognizing the malfunction calls it out clearly and precisely.
• MAINTAIN AIRPLANE CONTROL:
o It is mandatory that the Pilot Flying (PF) fly the airplane.
• ANALYZE THE SITUATION:
o Any further action should only be initiated after the malfunctioning
system has been positively identified.
Additional Information
Any occurrences of erroneous display data, even if intermittent, should be reported to maintenance.
More information can be found in the Boeing 737 Flight Crew Training Manual and Flight Crew Operations Manual. Operators may want to review the following:
Regarding a negative altitude reading triggering an alarm:
There are airports with runways below sea level which have airline service. If I'm not mistaken, Schipol is one of them. KIPL (Imperial County) airport in California has a runway altitude of -57 ft. KTRM (Thermal) does not have airline service, but imany business jets, including 737's, operate there. Runway altitude is -114 ft.
Last edited by DC3 Fan on 15 Apr 2009, 22:02, edited 1 time in total.
