Bracebrace is just clarifying a Certification requirementDesert Rat wrote: ↑19 Mar 2019, 09:43It is not only about a failure or a wrong information computed by envelope protection computer, it is also linked to a typical flight phase,attitude,thrust setting,etc...Bracebrace wrote: ↑18 Mar 2019, 10:23 Either the failure effect of a single failure is minor or major, and there is no initial risk for pax or pilots.
Either the failure effect of a single failure is hazardous or catastrophic and, there is a risk for pax or pilots. In the latter case the aircraft is not airworthy.
That makes the 737 max by definition, by rules and regulations, not airworthy. We have two crashes.
If in the future the failure effect is to be covered by software changes or hardware changes has nothing to do with the discussion. Boeing changes whatever they want (soft- or hardware) to get to the result: single failure leading to minor or major failure effects.
The internet discussions have nothing to do with these basic rules.
It is a combination of multiple factors, not only minor or major single failure.
Meaning the fix is more complicated, as it will have to take into consideration for solution validation, many different scenarii.
CS25.1309
(b) The aeroplane systems and associated components, considered separately and in relation to other systems, must be designed so that -
(1) Any catastrophic failure condition
(i) is extremely improbable; and
(ii) does not result from a single failure; and
(2) Any hazardous failure condition is extremely remote; and
(3) Any major failure condition is remote.
So whatever the change Boeing introduce, a single failure cannot lead to a catastrophic event (which means hull loss and/or multiple fatalities).