Turkish Airlines B737 crashes in Schiphol Amsterdam - TK1951

[TCAS_climb]

Ok, but in this case we're talking about a radio-altimeter. It works on the principle of a radar, and it should never indicate a negative altitude, even when landing in Thermal ('been there, cool place !) or Schipol.

[TCAS]

RA = H E I G H T (above the ground !!)

Example (horizontal flt): if the ground comes up RA 'Height' decrease and if the ground goes down RA 'Height' 'increase.

[DC3 Fan]

Right you are! I stand corrected!

[TCAS]

There are airports with runways below sea level which have airline service.

LLMZ (MTZ) is a nice example -1266' (-386 meters)

[earthman]

Yes I know a radalt gives height not altitude, so that's why I wondered how it is possible that 'the left LRRA system did not declare the data invalid'. Independently from that system declaring the data invalid or not, the autothrottle should do its own verification that it gets correct input.

I do withdraw my remark on how going from 1950 to -8 (well, not -8, but something very low) in an instant should be suspicious, since the plane might for example be landing on a runway which starts at the edge of a cliff.

Instead, why is there no redundancy in this system? Why would it use only one radalt as input if the plane has two of them?

[earthman]

There are airports with runways below sea level which have airline service.

LLMZ (MTZ) is a nice example -1266' (-386 meters)

I recall a story about a flight simulator (one of those real things, for pilots, not a game) where during development they found a bug where the plane would suddenly flip upside down when landing at AMS. This turned out to be due to the negative altitude of the airport.

[jan_olieslagers]

There are aerodromes with a negative AMSL, Schiphol is one indeed.
But the radio altimeter reads AGL, I should think - how can that ever go negative?

[Bracebrace]

Actually the negative value is normal.

The LRRA system is calibrated to give a "0" reading with the aircraft in a landing attitude. Since the antenna is in front of the main wheels, the indication will become negative when the nose is lowered on the runway. It is only a matter of calibration. When the aircraft is taxiing on the ground, the antenna is still some feet above the ground against the bottom of the aircraft and the device measures the height of the fuselage. In theory, you could even get a more negative indication if you'd hold a plate against the transmitter/receiver system. Never tried it...but the value is useless anyway. We need to have a "0" when the main wheels touch down during landing.

Take any Boeing EFIS aircraft standing on the ground, and look at the RA indication: it will be negative. The bigger the aircraft, the more negative the value is.

[earthman]

Actually the negative value is normal.

Okay, so the negative height is possible, and the sudden change is also possible.

The question remains, why does the plane only use one LRRAA as input for the autothrottle if there are two LRRAs on the plane?

[LX-LGX]

Official preliminary report:

In English:
http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/rappo ... ary_EN.pdf

In Dutch:
http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/rappo ... NL_def.pdf

Main page Investagation Board, in English:
http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/index.p ... -nadering/

[TCAS]

Official preliminary report:

At least The Dutch Safety Board (De Onderzoekzoeksraad voor Veiligheid) works faster and more transparent then the 9 to 12 and 13 to 17 Belgian 'Air Accident' investigation 'working hours' mentality.
Example: K4 207 Crash EBBR date: Sun May 25, 2008

I hope the THY1951 accident doesn't turns out to be a case where the Instructor let things get away from him (F/O incapacitation / line training / MCC) resulting in the crash of a perfectly serviceable aircraft.

I left my hope, the Instructor let things get away from him

[JAFflyer]

I hope the THY1951 accident doesn't turns out to be a case where the Instructor let things get away from him (F/O incapacitation / line training / MCC) resulting in the crash of a perfectly serviceable aircraft.

I left my hope, the Instructor let things get away from him

A typical example of the aircraft flying the crew iso the other way around. I bet the question was asked during the approach "what's it doing?" Too bad they paid with their (and others') lives.

[TCAS_climb]

Seems to me that you have three overloaded brains into the cockpit of a faulty aircraft. And they don't notice the problem before it gets out of control. Partly because of the machine not doing what it's supposed to be doing, but also because they forgot their airmanship skills at home that day.

What's not very encouraging is the attitude of the maintenance department, which released this particular aircraft several times in a row with a repeatedly defective equipment. OK, it may not be a critical item in the Minimum Equipment List, but the lack of redundancy in the autopilot/autothrottle systems has once again demonstrated that even minor maintenance items may have devastating consequences when you have weak defenses.

[Desert Rat]

[
I recall a story about a flight simulator (one of those real things, for pilots, not a game) where during development they found a bug where the plane would suddenly flip upside down when landing at AMS. This turned out to be due to the negative altitude of the airport.

Well, beside these problems, there's from time to time a Map shift event, sometimes due to flight guidance issue, sometimes nav. data base...
It is not common but most of the time, crew will have to react very swiftly, because the A/c is suddenly veering to another heading, and unfortunatelly, there's often a mountain in that direction...

[TCAS]

Ministerie presenteert rapport vliegtuigcrash
Uitgegeven: 22 juni 2009 07:18
Laatst gewijzigd: 22 juni 2009 07:17

HOOFDDORP - Het ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken komt maandag met het onderzoeksrapport naar de ramp met een toestel van Turkish Airlines op 25 februari.

De Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid van het ministerie heeft onderzocht hoe de hulpverlening na de crash is verlopen.

De presentatie van het rapport is om 16.00 uur op Schiphol. Behalve de inspectie zijn ook de burgemeester van Haarlemmermeer en de korpsbeheerder van de politie Haarlemmermeer aanwezig.

Door de crash met het toestel in een weiland vlakbij Schiphol kwamen negen mensen om het leven en raakten tientallen andere inzittenden gewond.

Source

[TCAS]

C2000 functioneerde niet goed na vliegtuigcrash
Uitgegeven: 22 juni 2009 16:18
Laatst gewijzigd: 22 juni 2009 16:18

AMSTERDAM - C2000, het communicatiesysteem van de hulpdiensten, werkte niet goed na de crash van een Turkish Airlines-vliegtuig bij Schiphol op 25 februari.

Hulpverleners konden vaak geen verbinding krijgen. Daardoor moesten ze met hun mobiele telefoon gaan bellen.

Dat blijkt uit een maandag gepubliceerd rapport van de Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid en de Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg over de hulpverlening na de crash. Bij het ongeval kwamen negen inzittenden om en raakten tientallen anderen gewond.

Full article (in Dutch) can be found H E R E

"Have fun, Fly safe, don't forget to lower the gear and stay out of trees"

[LX-LGX]

The OVV - Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid - is investigating the causes of the crash.
The IOOV - Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid - is investigating the rescue operation itself.

It's this second Board, IOOV, who has published its report today. And as we could expect from The Netherlands, they do call the problems by name:

- the Dutch communication system for emergency services (system C2000) malfunctionned. It couldn't handle the number of groups, forcing many emergency services to use their cell phones;

-public address speakers were used too much (also for non urgent public calls):

- injured passengers were supposed to be transported to the hospital immediately, but some were transported to the sports centre nearby the crash site (meant only for non-injured pax). Therefore, the doctors there decided to send all 40 passengers (including non-injured) there to hospitals. Cause for this: bad selection at the crash site;

- it took too long before a decent list of injured and deceased pax was available. Cause: bad registration at the crash site;

- almost no information was given to the local hospitals about the number of pax on their way to them and/or about their injuries;

- the Safety Board mixed up with the rescue workers, and they didn't present themselves to the rescue staff (however, the Safety Board was legally allowed to work there, and they didn't object the rescue itself);

Good news about the rescue:

- all necessary rescue workers reacted immediately at first notice;

- this quick response allowed that many injured passengers were transported to a hospital for life saving treatment.

Final conclusion from IOOV - Inspection for Public Safety: good job by the rescue team(s).

- - -

Trust the report will soon be available here:
http://www.ioov.nl/algemene_onderdelen/ ... /rapporten

[Bralo20]

Hmm... If C2000 is failing in The Netherlands I even don't want to know how the ASTRID network will handle itself during a real crisissituation in Belgium...

ASTRID has failed before even in non crisissituation (whole network was down about a bit more then a year ago during a faillure at the servers in the ASTRID HQ). We even had to use our very old siren to get emergency personnel to the fire station for a fire during the ASTRID blackout... (since ASTRID did forget it to mention to the emergency services that the paging system was down). Radiocomm is also not good in closed areas or building which forces to use DMO mode.

Both a TETRA based system but The Netherlands have far more expirience with it and are using at longer then we use ASTRID in Belgium....

[jan_olieslagers]

Hmm... If C2000 is failing in The Netherlands I even don't want to know how the ASTRID network will handle itself during a real crisissituation in Belgium...

I was thinking the very same thing! The Dutch emergency services deserve every respect for having done a good job, and for their critical consideration of aspects that were less than perfect.

[TCAS]

Hmm... If C2000 is failing in The Netherlands I even don't want to know how the ASTRID network will handle itself during a real crisissituation in Belgium....

Belgian politicians and institutions are masters in cover up disaster, incompetence and other embarrassing information

In other words, the public will 'officially' never (< 5-10 yrs after the real crisis situation) know if A.S.T.R.I.D. had shortcomings or failed.

"Have fun, Fly safe, don't forget to lower the gear and stay out of trees"