Turkish Airlines B737 crashes in Schiphol Amsterdam - TK1951

[TCAS]

From my limited Microsoft Flight Simulator experience at 2000 ft you can still do a lot with a plane, even if you loose thrust for say 10 seconds.
Am I the only one thinking like this?

1. MFS is for dummies
2. First 'inflight' faulty RA sign @1950' (RA -8') configuration warning (gear).
3. The captain/instructor didn't react/respond 'properly' on the 40kn BELOW reference speed
4. Stall recovery (stick shaker) @500' (A/T retard mode --> engine spin-up --> Full power)

My 2 cents

[LX-LGX]

It seems interesting that untill now it seems no media is talking about the 100 seconds between autothrottle action and pilot action that is mentioned in the boeing report.

In the item on VRT-news ysterday as well as the article referred to above, it seems as if the pilots reacted immediately. From my limited Microsoft Flight Simulator experience at 2000 ft you can still do a lot with a plane, even if you loose thrust for say 10 seconds.
Am I the only one thinking like this?

I also saw the VRT news, and it was unbelievable how a state television with almost unlimited sources (on Belgian scale off course) reported on the Safety Board's first report. I usually abstain from technical matters, but as we had so many info here from cockpit crew (thanks!), it's very obvious that the non-reaction during the 100 seconds have caused the crash, and not the faulty altitude meter.

The full statement by Pieter van Volenhoven (chairman Safety Board) was too long for full broadcast on tv, so the VRT-journo who had to cover this story had to do some cut/paste work. The journalist apparently has no knowledge of aviation in any way, so the cut/paste was done at a very, very amateuristic way. The result was that the VRT said that the crew reacted "immediately" when the altitude meter ordered the autopilot to reduce power. The journalist from the VRT is unaware that the crew only reacted after 100 seconds and after the stall warning.

Aviation journalist Luk De Wilde, who was invited to comment, has corrected the info the journalist gave by saying that the crew reacted far too late, but he had only one minute to comment. And, off course, the VRT already concluded that Boeing's altitude meter has caused the crash.

This is the link to the VRT-news (= just click on the picture); followed by the report on the crash by "De Redactie" = VRT-online.

http://www.deredactie.be/cm/de.redactie ... senrapport

VRT-online is making the same error as their colluegues from the News: thet don't mention the important 100 seconds, and they suggest that harm was done before the crew could react.

De Boeing 737 van Turkish Airlines was al aan de landing begonnen toen op 1.950 voet (zowat 600 meter) hoogte de linkse radiohoogtemeter een fout signaal doorgaf, vertelde Mr. Pieter van Vollenhoven, voorzitter van de onafhankelijke Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid.
The 737 had already started the landing when, at 1.950ft, the left altitude meter transmitted a faulty signal.

Het toestel vloog op dat moment op automatische piloot. Omdat de linkse radiometer doorgaf dat de hoogte -8 voet bedroeg, werd de gashendel automatisch dichtgeschroefd. Het vermogen en de vliegsnelheid werden tot een minimum herleid, wat automatisch gebeurt net voor het vliegtuig de landingsbaan gaat raken.

The plane was on autopilot. Because the left altitude meter indicated -8ft, the power throttle was automaticly shut down. Power and speed were thus reduced to a minimum, like just it's done automaticly just before touch down.

Daardoor viel het vliegtuig helemaal stil en verloor het plots erg snel hoogte. De bemanning reageerde nog en gaf vol gas, maar toen was het te laat. Overigens is het perfect normaal dat een landing wordt uitgevoerd op automatische piloot. "Dat is een vrije keuze", zei Van Vollenhoven.
My next translation may sound ridiculous, but hey, I'm just translating...: This caused the plane to a standstill and it lost altitude very fast. The crew reacted by giving full power, but it was too late by then.

Het toestel crashte in een veld en 9 mensen kwamen om. 80 passagiers raakten gewond, van wie er nu nog 28 in het ziekenhuis liggen. Overigens blijkt uit gegevens van de zwarte doos dat er ook al eerder problemen waren met de hoogtemeter. In Turkije komt het onderzoek naar de crash in Schiphol hard aan. De Turkse pilotenvereniging vindt de uitkomst van het rapport niet bevredigend. Verschillende kranten blijven de piloten verdedigen. Eerder werd in Turkse kranten geschreven dat de verkeersleiding in Schiphol aan de basis zou liggen van de crash. De Turkse piloten werden vorige week in hun thuisland als helden begraven omdat er bij de crash maar 9 doden vielen.

[TCAS]

First Class Wi(n)dow Dressing.

100 (one hundred) seconds is a of lot of time.
What were they doing? nose digging, playing poker or consulting manuals "how to hand Fly a B738".

Since when became the VRT part of TRT ?

The Turkey's are getting 'real' desperate, see Piloten reageerden niet te laat (NU.nl)

[fcw]

For all the desktable pilots and journo's here at little explanation:
2000 ft is the altitude at which they started their final descent and decelaration. Throttles moving to idle is a normal event during this phase. It was only around 1000 ft when the engines should have spooled up that the crew should have noticed the defect. Fully configured it would only take 10 seconds from normal approach speed to stickshaker. During those 5-ish of those 10 seconds they went through the landing checklist. Probably the trainee was a bit late in advancing the levers, the captain saw the speed dropping, and ordered: "I have controls!" Following this command the trainee took his hands off the levers and they moved to idle again before the training captain had his hands on the levers and firewalled them but they spooled up too late...
So yes the crew could and should have reacted earlier but don't make it look as they were sleeping!

[TCAS]

So yes the crew could and should have reacted earlier but don't make it look as they were sleeping!

THY1951 crashed because of the following factors:
- System knowledge
- Procedural knowledge
- Flightdeck culture
- Aviation skills
- Mentality

[FlyA330]

Human Error....

This is all about Basic IFR Flying Skills... LOOK AT YOUR INSTRUMENTS !!!!

[TCAS]

Human Error....

This is all about Basic IFR Flying Skills... LOOK AT YOUR INSTRUMENTS !!!!

Any skybus driver should know: from 500' you'll have one hand on the controlwheel/stick and the other hand on the throttle, which must be (somewhere) in the middle and NOT closed (idle/RETARD).

If it's not clearly stated in the checklist/manual and/or SOP etc. etc. it seems that modern Aircraft pilots can't think for themselves anymore

What's next?
If Vref drops below -5, a digital voice saying SPEED LOW.. SPEED LOW.. SPEED LOW..

[LX-LGX]

For all the desktable pilots and journo's here at little explanation...

Indeed, you should ask for a seperate forum room - just for pilots. You then won't be hindered anymore by remarks from aviation lovers who don't know how to fly a plane (but who know how tickets must sold, how cargo must be sold, how cargo must be loaded, how complaints have to be handled, ...) One does not need to have a Ferrari to do maintenance on it.

Probably the trainee was a bit late in advancing the levers, the captain saw the speed dropping, and ordered: "I have controls!" Following this command the trainee took his hands off the levers and they moved to idle again before the training captain had his hands on the levers and firewalled them but they spooled up too late...

As a passenger, I am entitled to be flown by people who are fully qualified. I do understand that pilots have to pass on their knowledge to the next generation, so I have no problem that a trainee takes over. But please: as soon as there is the minest problem - like a broken altitude meter - I'm entitled that the best qualified person takes over command immediately.

So yes the crew could and should have reacted earlier but don't make it look as they were sleeping

I don't think someone said they were sleeping. But Boeing's Recommended Action advice for this accident says it all: "... In addition, crews should be reminded to carefully monitor primary flight instruments (airspeed, attitude etc.) and the FMA for autoflight modes. More information can be found in the Boeing 737 Flight Crew Training Manual and Flight Crew Operations Manual..."

[Marten]

From my limited Microsoft Flight Simulator experience at 2000 ft you can still do a lot with a plane, even if you loose thrust for say 10 seconds.
Am I the only one thinking like this?

1. MFS is for dummies

My 2 cents

Excuse me, a lot of 'real-life' life pilots use to fly on MFS only because of the realism you can reach with it.
Payware planes are developed for gettin as close as possible to reality.
check out www.precisionmanuals.com if you don't believe me...

[TCAS]

Excuse me, a lot of 'real-life' life pilots use to fly on MFS only because of the realism you can reach with it

With respect

There's a huge difference between MFS --> Level D "Full Flight Simulator(s)" and/or the real Aircraft.

Indeed, you should ask for a seperate forum room - just for pilots. You then won't be hindered anymore by remarks from aviation lovers who don't know how to fly a plane (but who know how tickets must sold, how cargo must be sold, how cargo must be loaded, how complaints have to be handled, ...)

In general pilots are 'more or less' like 'The Untouchable' health care doctors.
They can't do anything wrong and blame (example: ad-hoc complications/malfunctions/worsening weather conditions etc. etc.) - in the beginning - (Denial Phase) in most cases 'always' someone else.

See Pilot Error statistics
Aviation accidents and incidents (Wikipedia)
Aviation accident statistics (Planecrashinfo)

[Nevihta]

Isn't there a sort of correlation between altimeter and GPWS to prevent that kind of errors ?

[grnkg]

Isn't there a sort of correlation between altimeter and GPWS to prevent that kind of errors ?

Well, the GPWS takes its altitude info from the RadAlt, so that pretty much rules out the possibility of one monitoring the other.

Besides, when established on the ILS, the GPWS will only generate audible warning <<GLIDESLOPE>> when the aircraft deviates from the glidepath.

In the case of the THY 737 the autopilot managed to stay within margin of the glidepath by increasing the aircraft's attitude (nose up), which off course went at the cost of the airspeed...

Kind regards,
GR.

[Nevihta]

Well, the GPWS takes its altitude info from the RadAlt, so that pretty much rules out the possibility of one monitoring the other.

Besides, when established on the ILS, the GPWS will only generate audible warning <<GLIDESLOPE>> when the aircraft deviates from the glidepath.

In the case of the THY 737 the autopilot managed to stay within margin of the glidepath by increasing the aircraft's attitude (nose up), which off course went at the cost of the airspeed...

Kind regards,
GR.

Thanks for the explanation. Maybe I didn't understood well, but it looks like the reference altimeter was wrong, so that the plane "tried to land" when it was not above the runway, and even well in the air.
Wouldn't it be possible for the fms to "double chek" with the GPWS.
That could prevent errors due to altimeter settings too (forget to set local QNH...)

Thanks

[JCO]

Engines idle, you hear and feel this !

Nose up attitude increasing steadily, any pilot can feel and see this !

And still they don't react, I don't understand this.

[TCAS]

11-FEB-2009
Boeing 737NG Fleet Team Resolution Process Item (FTRP) 03674-737

Boeing has received numerous reports related to discrepant radio altimeter system operation. Typical symptons include the appearance of the RA Flag, Landing Gear Configuration Warnings, negative altitude values displayed while the airplane is in cruise or above 2,500 feet, and, more recently, autopilot disconnects on approach. Troubleshooting using the DFCS and/or PSEU BITE may find fault codes to the radio altimeter.

P A G E 1 (PDF)
P A G E 2 (PDF)
P A G E 3 (PDF)

THY (TK) introduced additional 500' (AMS) calls:
- I land
- You land
- Autoland
- Pasture land

Air Traffic Control the Netherlands (LVNL): THY.... (TK) Maintain speed at or above Vref untill touchdown.

[regi]

I was away for some days.
Important question: what is the latest body count ( still 9 ? ) and state of serious injured people ?

[LX-LGX]

On Saturday 7 March, there will be a memorial service at AMS (Schiphol-Oost) at 12h05. This will be broadcasted live on Dutch tv - NED-1 - from 12h00.

Just before this ceremony, all traffic at AMS will be put on hold between 12h00 and 12h02: no landings, no take offs, no ground movements, two minutes of silence in all airport buildings.

[TCAS]

Latest (Dutch) media article Hoogtemeter ramptoestel was al gerepareerd (AD.nl)

iPaper Boeing 737 NG synoptic training manual (Scribd.com)

Introduction Boeing 737 full motion simulator cockpit V I D E O (Aviafilms.com)

[JoskeDR]

FLyA330 has it all right: basic IFR skills!
I fail to understand how an instructor and a qualified F/O(on the jumpseat) could have let it go this far...

[LX-LGX]

FROM: THE BOEING COMPANY
...

This message is sent to all 737-100,-200,-300,-400,-500,-600,-700,-800,-900,-BBJ customers and to respective Boeing Field Service bases, Regional Directors, the Air Transport Association, International Air Transport Association, and Airline Resident Representatives.

...

Boeing Recommended Action

...

- Boeing recommends operators inform flight crews of the above investigation details and the DSB interim report when it is released. In addition, crews should be reminded to carefully monitor primary flight instruments (airspeed, attitude etc.) and the FMA for autoflight modes. More information can be found in the Boeing 737 Flight Crew Training Manual and Flight Crew Operations Manual.

...

This is no topic for a joke, but Boeing has made a painfull error in their mail: "... crews should be reminded to carefully monitor primary flight instruments (airspeed, attitude etc.)..."